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Abstract Coffee producers in many parts of the world
have the option of either becoming a member of and selling
their coffee to a Fairtrade and organic co-operative, or
selling it to a ‘‘coyote’’, the Central American nickname for
intermediary purchaser. This study investigates why dif-
ferent producers make different choices, looking at both
material and immaterial costs and benefits of the two
choices. A qualitative study from Chiapas (Mexico) finds
that a main reason for not choosing the co-operatives is the
production requirements that follow organic certification.
A survey on production costs confirms that members of an
organic co-operative have more work hours than non-
members in the same area. A probit analysis indicates that
both coffee plot size and number of working household
members influence the producers’ decision on sales chan-
nel. However, the study also finds that aspects not related
to the organic production requirements can affect the
choice, such as the level of trust in co-operative leadership,
and the co-operatives’ payment systems.
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Introduction
The Fairtrade labelling system emerged in the south of
Mexico in the late 1980s. The era of the International
Coffee Agreement1 and government price regulations had
just ended, and producer owned co-operatives that had
previously sold their coffee to government owned institu-
tions were now faced with low prices offered by local
intermediary purchasers (Renard 1996). The creation of the
Fairtrade scheme gave the co-operatives an opportunity to
sell their coffee on the international market, at a ‘‘guar-
anteed minimum price’’ in addition to a price premium.2
The intention of the Fairtrade system is to give consumers
the opportunity to buy goods from producers in the South
which have fulfilled certain standards, ‘‘designed to address
the imbalance of power in trading relationships, unstable
markets and the injustices of conventional trade’’ (FLO
2013). Importers who purchase from producers who have
fulfilled these standards market the products using the
Fairtrade label, recognisable by consumers. The Fairtrade
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1 An agreement between coffee producer and consumer countries
first signed in 1962, aimed at keeping coffee prices stable by using
export quotas that government bodies in each producer country were
responsible for maintaining.
2 In 2013 the minimum price was 1.40 USD/lb for washed Arabica
coffee and the premium 0.20 USD/lb. According to ICO statistics this
is roughly the same as the average price for ‘‘Other Mild Arabica’’
coffee for 2013 (ICO 2014).
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system soon expanded, and in 2011 there were 329 Fair-
trade labelled coffee producer organisations in the world,
12 % of these in Mexico (FLO 2012). Today the Mexican
Fairtrade co-operatives generally have the organic certifi-
cate as well. This does not include a guaranteed minimum
price but qualifies them for a premium of between 10 and
30 US cents/lb. In contrast to the Fairtrade system, which
certifies the trade process, the organic standards regulate
practices in the production process, and consumers pur-
chase organically labeled products mainly because of the
ecological and health benefits gained from eliminating
chemical pesticides and fertilizers (Bacon 2005).
Many coffee producers in Chiapas, Mexico, as well as in
other parts of the coffee producing world, are now in a
situation where they can choose between becoming a
member of and selling their coffee to a Fairtrade and
organically certified co-operative, or selling it to a local
intermediary purchaser. One would perhaps expect the co-
operative to be the preferred option. The intermediaries
have a reputation of not only collaborating with each other
in order to keep local coffee prices low; they are also said
to cheat the farmers on the weight and quality of their
coffee (Raynolds 2002; Milford 2012; Mujawamariya et al.
2013). This is probably the reason why in Central America
they are nicknamed ‘coyotes’, after the prairie wolf that
feeds on dead animals. In contrast the certified co-opera-
tives offer members high and stable prices, and Fairtrade
farmers have been found to have higher asset value and
credit access, and to be less risk averse than non-certified
counterparts (Bacon 2005; Ruben 2008). Other positive
effects are the investments of Fairtrade premiums in col-
lective goods that benefit whole communities (Raynolds
et al. 2004; Murray et al. 2006; Ruben 2008). Studies have
also found that certified production has an empowerment
and capacity building effect, leading to increased bar-
gaining power of grass roots organisations, and that the
training and education of certification workers promotes
the development of a skilled workforce at village level
(Raynolds et al. 2004; Mutersbaugh 2004).
Despite these positive impacts, it is a fact that many
producers choose the private intermediary before Fairtrade
and organic co-operative membership. Since its beginning,
the aim of the Fairtrade labelling system has been to
expand and to always include a larger number of producers,
while at the same time increasing the positive impact on its
participants (Murray et al. 2006). At the same time it has
long been recognized that there is a dilemma between the
aim of social equity, or broadening and deepening the
impact of Fairtrade, and the aim of economic efficiency at
all levels in the system (Raynolds et al. 2004). A study of
the reasons producers have for not joining Fairtrade and
organic co-operatives, and an identification of the differ-
ence in characteristics of those who choose one or the
other, will tell us to what extent the Fairtrade labelling
system has the capacity to reach far, and to reach the
poorest and most vulnerable, without compromising with
the efficiency aims.
The nature of the co-operative enterprise and how it
works may partly explain the producers’ choice. In general
the main economic benefits of agricultural marketing co-
operatives are the profits gained from marketing activities,
usually redistributed to members according to quantities
delivered (LeVay 1983). The decision on whether or not to
join is primarily based on a valuation of the material costs
and benefits, first and foremost those derived from the
control on co-operative assets and rent redistribution
(Pascucci et al. 2012), but also from other benefits such as
access to credit and materials through economies of scale
purchases (Deininger 1995; Rice 2001). Producers may
also seek immaterial benefits or social goals through co-
operative membership, such as interaction with other
members and the development of personal relationships
(Hansen et al. 2002). Some of these costs and benefits will
be valued differently among the producers. For instance,
time spent on meetings will for some people be seen a
value, for others it is only a cost (Hansmann 1996). Co-
operatives may also provide collective goods gained from,
for instance, lobbying activities (Fulton 1999; Rice 2001),
or destabilising a monopsonist or a cartel of private pur-
chasers (Sexton 1990; Fulton 2004; Milford 2012). Dif-
ferent valuations of these collective goods, and the
perception of the co-operative as an ideologically based
organisation may influence the membership decision, and
some farmers may be motivated to join by the norm of
fairness and a sense of duty and social responsibility
(Fulton 1999; Thorp et al. 2005). Also different levels of
trust, both in other members and in the management, may
explain the co-operative membership choice (Hansen et al.
2002; Jones 2004).
Empirical studies of producers choosing between co-
operatives and intermediaries, and the costs and benefits
from the different options, have been made in several
countries, including in the developing world (Thorp et al.
2005; Basu and Chakraborty 2008; Bernard and Spielman
2009; Barham et al. 2011; Fischer and Qaim 2012). There
is also a study from Rwanda looking at why members of
Fairtrade coffee co-operatives choose side-selling to pri-
vate intermediaries. This found that producers who had
long-standing relationships with intermediaries had a
preference for them because of the credit opportunities and
immediate payment they offered (Mujawamariya et al.
2013). Some studies have found that the fixed costs of co-
operative membership, such as compulsory production
requirements, meeting obligations, and membership fees,
are higher for producers who are poor or gain a small share
of their income from agriculture; hence they are less likely
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to join (Bernard and Spielman 2009). On the other hand,
the advantages of selling the product jointly could be
smaller for the largest producers and therefore make them
less interested in the co-operative, which gives a ‘‘middling
effect’’ (Thorp et al. 2005; Bernard and Spielman 2009;
Fischer and Qaim 2012).
Previous studies looking at membership in Fairtrade and
organic co-operatives in Mexico and Central America have
found that the requirements to produce organically are
more time consuming and therefore make the co-operative
option less attractive (Pe´rez Grovas 2000; Bray et al. 2002;
Jaffee 2007). Some authors argue that the lack of profit-
ability of organic coffee production imply that govern-
ments and donors should focus on other issues than
certification schemes (Beuchelt and Zeller 2011). How-
ever, a study from Nicaragua found that the organic pro-
duction methods motivated membership, because they
were seen as safer, and required a lower expenditure level
(Bacon 2005). According to Martinez-Torres (2006),
organic farming, which is cash-cheap and labour intensive,
is appropriate for the cash-poor families in Chiapas, where
underemployment is high and opportunity costs for extra
family labour is low. Hence smaller farmers are more
likely to be organic and larger farmers are more likely to
use chemical technology (Martinez-Torres 2006). The
tendency for Fairtrade and organic co-operative members
to have smaller coffee areas and a higher ratio of on-farm
family labour per coffee hectare was also found in a more
recent study from Nicaragua (Beuchelt and Zeller 2011).
On the other hand, Bray et al. (2002) found in their study of
three organic coffee co-operatives in Chiapas that the
members are predominately from the 2–5 ha stratum, and
not from the smallest producers with\2 ha. This is to some
extent confirmed in a later study from Chiapas which finds
that the average size of organic farms is 2.9 ha, while that
of the conventional is 2 ha (Barham et al. 2011).
This study seeks to reveal why producers choose as they
do in Chiapas, Mexico. The aim of the study is twofold.
Firstly to identify the main reasons why producers make
different choices concerning co-operative membership,3
focussing particularly on the claim that organic production
is more time consuming. Secondly to investigate if there
are certain characteristics of producers which make them
more likely to be members of a Fairtrade and organic co-
operative. This study differs from previous work in that it
focuses on both the material and immaterial costs and
benefits of participating in Fairtrade and organic co-oper-
atives. It also uses a range of different methods in order to
gain thorough insight of the theme, including an
assessment of the different organic production require-
ments. The first section presents the results of a qualitative
study among stakeholders in the coffee sector in Chiapas,
Mexico. This section also contains the results of a survey
among organic and Fairtrade certified co-operatives in
Chiapas. The next section presents analysis of two different
data sources: first the reasons for not joining an organic co-
operative as explained by producers participating in a
household survey in Jitotol, Chiapas. The second analysis
is based on a survey from Jitotol on costs and benefits
related to organic production in comparison with other
production methods. In the last section an analysis of
household data from the region of Jitotol is carried out,
including a mean-comparison and a probit analysis on
whether or not producers with certain characteristics have a
higher likelihood of being co-operative members.
Coffee co-operatives and membership: case study
from Chiapas, Mexico
This section presents the results of a qualitative case study
from Chiapas, Mexico. The aim of the study was to gain a
deeper insight to the complexity of the situation of the
coffee producers, and their motivation for making different
choices concerning co-operative membership. The study is
based on 10 months of field research in 2006/2007. During
this period interviews were made with coffee purchasers,
government officials working in the coffee sector, and co-
operative members and leaders from 15 different co-oper-
atives. All the co-operatives were certified, mostly both
Fairtrade and organic, and some only organic. The majority
were from the Norte, Centro and Altos regions, but co-
operatives and other coffee stakeholders from the Selva,
Sierra and Soconusco regions were also interviewed. Three
focus groups were organised, one with co-operative
members, one with non-members and one with a mixture of
members and non-members. The study includes a survey of
38 organic and Fairtrade co-operatives from Northern
Chiapas.4 All the interviews and focus groups were con-
ducted in Spanish. A tape recorder was used and the
recordings were later transcribed.
3 The question is about choosing membership or not, and not about
members side-selling to intermediaries, although the two aspects are
closely linked.
4 The Mexican certifier organisation Certimex held a workshop in
San Cristobal and Tuxtla Guiterrez in May 2007. Representatives
from all the organic co-operatives in Northern Chiapas partici-
pated.The representatives, one or two from each organisation, were
mostly part of the technical staff, and all of them spoke Spanish and
were able to read and write. The organisers from Certimex allowed
me to hand out a questionnaire, which most of the participants
completed.
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Coffee cooperatives and labeling systems in Chiapas
Chiapas is the main coffee producing state of Mexico and
also one of the poorest. In Mexico 99 % of coffee pro-
ducers have \10 ha of coffee land (Giovannucci and Ju-
a´rez Cruz 2006). In Chiapas 85 % of the producers have
\2 ha, which is barely enough for making a living (Barrera
et al. 2004). The average coffee plot size is 1.4 ha (SAG-
ARPA 2005). There are few employment opportunities in
rural areas in Chiapas (Lopez Are´valo 2007), and some
studies have estimated that direct government support and
overseas remittances on average amount to more than half
of the income of the coffee producers (Giovannucci and
Jua´rez Cruz 2006). High quality arabica coffee is by far the
most common coffee variety produced in Chiapas, as in the
rest of Mexico. But strong fluctuations in international
coffee prices is a problem which destabilizes household
incomes (Talbot 2004).
In 2006/2007 there were 38 Fairtrade labeled co-oper-
atives in Chiapas. The main criteria for Fairtrade certifi-
cation of co-operatives are that the majority of members
are small producers, that the organization is democratic and
transparent, non-discriminating, able to export coffee and
environmentally concerned. The Fairtrade Labelling Or-
gansation (FLO), with headquarters in Bonn, is responsible
for the certification process. Market access is one of the
most important benefits of being certified. However, there
is no guarantee that a certified co-operative will find pur-
chasers willing to pay the Fairtrade guaranteed minimum
price, the premiums, and the licence fee in order to use the
Fairtrade label. In fact, on a world scale the average
amount of coffee sold under Fairtrade conditions rarely
surpasses 25 % of the production (Ruben 2012). Co-oper-
atives that do not find buyers for their certified coffee are
forced to sell the coffee at conventional prices, which
means that members will receive a lower price.
Since organically certified coffee is both more market-
able and provides an extra premium, FLO encourages, but
does not require, co-operatives to obtain the organic cer-
tificate. In Chiapas in 2007 there were 174 organic coffee
co-operatives (SNIDRUS 2007). In order to become a
member of an organically certified co-operative, coffee
producers must apply organic production methods. There is
a transition period of 3 years before the producers get the
full organic price for their coffee. Members must also
sometimes pay an entry fee and a yearly fee to cover
administrative costs. The co-operatives cover the certifi-
cation costs, and are inspected by auditors from organic
certifier organisations, as well as from FLO, on a yearly
basis. The process of becoming organically certified is
complex, and requires much effort from the producers’ and
staff members involved in its administration (Mutersbaugh
2004).
As democratic organisations, the Fairtrade and organic co-
operatives are run by members elected for managerial tasks for
2 or 3 years at the time. The elected committees are usually
supported by staff members hired for longer periods. As a
member you are expected to sell your coffee to the co-oper-
ative, but because of requirements from importers some co-
operatives do not accept low quality coffee, which means that
members are obliged to sell some of their harvest to the
intermediaries. Most of the surplus from marketing the coffee
is redistributed to members according to quantities delivered,
as part of the price per kilo. But the co-operatives also spend
some of the Fairtrade premium they receive on productive
reinvestments and social goods such as roads improvements,
education and health care (Raynolds et al. 2004).
Most coffee producers in Chiapas process their coffee
into green coffee before they sell it. The small scale pro-
ducers who are not organized in a co-operative either sell it
to the local intermediaries who come to the village with
their pick-up trucks, or transport it themselves to a small
town such as the municipality centre. Here there are larger
purchasers who offer slightly better prices than those
obtained in the villages, but transport costs must be
deducted. The intermediaries transport the coffee to a lar-
ger city centre such as Tuxtla and Tapachula where it is
delivered to a processing plant that usually belongs to a
transnational exporting company.
Since high quality organic coffee produced in Chiapas is
in demand, many co-operatives that are both Fairtrade and
organically certified sell a high share of their coffee as
certified, and therefore generally offer members higher
coffee prices than the intermediary purchasers. Still, in
most places in Chiapas the majority of the producers sell to
the intermediary, even when there is a co-operative nearby.
Most of the co-operatives are open to new members. In
fact, many co-operatives are actively seeking more mem-
bers, as they have established relationships with importers
and their coffee is in demand.
Reasons for joining Fairtrade organic co-operatives
When asking producers what is the advantage of selling
coffee to a certified co-operative instead of an intermedi-
ary, the most frequent answer was that the price is better. In
2007 the average price offered by coffee intermediaries in
Chiapas was 1.37 USD per kg (SPC 2007). As can be seen
in Table 1, this is less than what any of the organic co-
operatives that participated in the survey paid their mem-
bers the same year, even for the first transition year. One of
the co-operatives paid as much as 77 % more than the
average intermediary price, and on average the co-opera-
tives paid 44 % more. The Fairtrade labelled co-operatives
offered on average 20 cents more per kilo than co-opera-
tives that were only organically certified.
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The price the co-operatives offer depends on how much
they manage to sell as Fairtrade, and organic. Co-opera-
tives that are both Fairtrade and organic are usually more
successful in finding buyers in the labelled markets than
co-operatives that are only organic. Many co-operatives
have also invested in their own roaster and grinder and sell
their coffee in packages with their own label, mainly
locally. Some co-operatives have also opened their own
cafe´s, the most well-known are perhaps the ones of Union
de la Selva and Majomut in the tourist town of San
Christobal. But there are also others, like the cafe´ of
CIRSA, catering for locals in the municipality of Simojovel
de Allende. Going further up the value chain in this manner
usually generates higher incomes for the members.
The higher price offered by the co-operative has been
found to intensify competition among intermediaries in the
region and thereby increase their price offer, the so-called
‘‘competitive yardstick effect’’ of co-operatives (Milford
2012). This effect was noticed by many stakeholders, and
some of the producers interviewed answered that the reason
they had joined a co-operative was to ‘‘combatir el coyote’’,
to fight the intermediary. But the difference between the co-
operative and the intermediary price depends on the inter-
national price level, which is highly volatile. The lower is
the conventional coffee price, the larger is the benefit from
receiving the Fairtrade minimum price. Co-operatives that
are organic, but not Fairtrade, do not get a guaranteed
minimum price, only a premium. This is a disadvantage
when the conventional price is lower than the Fairtrade
minimum price. When the conventional coffee price goes
higher than the Fairtrade minimum price the Fairtrade price
goes to the same level as the conventional price. In these
periods only the premium constitutes the difference between
the conventional and the certified price, for both organic and
Fairtrade. Because the small co-operatives often have higher
transaction costs than the private companies, the difference
in price offer is not very large (Pe´rez Grovas et al. 2002).
This makes the intermediary price offer more attractive, as
explained by this co-operative advisor:
When the price is very low, the co-operative guar-
antees a more fair price. On the contrary when the
market prices are very high, the prices of the co-
operative are not competitive.
Co-operative adviser, Los Altos
Hence there are periods when selling to the intermediary is
more tempting for the co-operative members. Risk aversion
and a preference for stable future incomes may influence
the decision. Or, as this stakeholder claims, it is a question
about understanding the coffee price system:
The members understand that the price can go down.
Those who leave in order to sell to the coyote live in
the moment. They don’t understand the changing of
the prices.
Former co-operative president, Norte region
Another motivation for co-operative membership is the
different types of support offered. All the organic co-
operatives in Chiapas offer members technical assistance
on coffee production. But in addition most of them receive
government funding for specific agricultural activities,
some of which are related to coffee production, others not.
Examples are support given in the form of fruit trees, pigs,
chicken and rabbits. For an independent farmer it is
impossible to access this type of support, because it can
only be distributed through a registered organisation. This
also makes co-operative membership attractive for pro-
ducers with little coffee production.
Ideology may also influence the producers’ choice.
According to Gonzalez and Nigh (2005), the co-operatives in
Chiapas that initiated the organic movement had a strong
ideological base, which linked the organic practice with
indigenous identity and poor farmer interests. Some co-
operatives have also been formed under the influence of
religious people such as priests or nuns, and many co-opera-
tives still emphasise Catholicism in their organisation. In
addition there are several coffee co-operatives with political
links, such as those who follow the ideology of the Zapatistas.
Others identify themselves as indigenous groups. In the survey
conducted with organic co-operatives, 25 of 34 (74 %) said
they had an ideology which united the members. According to
Raynolds et al. (2004) group identity is one of the central
elements to the success of Fairtrade co-operatives. A co-
operative ideology can become the glue that will keep the
members faithful in times of high conventional prices. But on
the other hand, by emphasising their ideology the co-opera-
tives may also exclude farmers who do not identify with it.
Reasons for not joining
To become members of a Fairtrade and organic co-opera-
tive, farmers usually have to pay an entry fee, and they
Table 1 Payment by co-operatives, in USD
Mean Median Min Max Answers
Kg price conventional
coffee (1st year as
member)
1.7 1.6 1.5 1.9 7
Kg price coffee in
transition (2nd year as
member)
1.8 1.6 1.4 2.6 12
Kg price organically
certified coffee (3rd and
following years)
2 1.9 1.8 2.5 27
Source: Survey of 38 organic co-operatives in Northern Chiapas,
Mexico, May 2007
Co-operative or coyote? 581
123
often also pay a yearly fee to cover different administrative
costs. These fees were rarely mentioned as an important
reason for not joining co-operatives. Very few co-opera-
tives have a significantly high entry fee, and those who do,
do not require that the entering member pays everything at
once. Probably the fees are in some cases high enough to
deter certain farmers from entering the co-operatives, but
in Chiapas this seems to be the exception rather than the
norm. An overview of entry fees and payments during the
first 3 years for the organically certified co-operatives in
Northern Chiapas is found in Table 2 below. Seven co-
operatives (30 %) had no entry fee for new members, and
seven had no yearly payments.
When asked about co-operative costs, stakeholders
mentioned other requirements for co-operative membership
more often than membership fees. One such requirement is
the obligation to attend meetings, both the monthly ones at
community level, and the yearly general assemblies. Often
members are punished with a fine or exclusion from the co-
operative if they fail to show up repeatedly. This could
make co-operative membership less attractive for farmers
who dislike spending time at meetings.
But the stakeholders’ most often mentioned reason for
not wanting to become a co-operative member was the
organic production requirements. A co-operative adviser
explained the choice of the non-members like this:
They prefer to work like that with the intermediaries,
the coyotes. For them it is less work. It is less work in
the sense that they can cultivate their coffee as it is.
Although it might be fermented, of bad quality, they
can use chemicals, the work is easier. On the con-
trary, for those who enter the co-operative it’s a little
work, they have to take care of their coffee fields,
they have to apply organic compost, take care of the
plants, not use pesticides, nothing chemical, well it’s
more strict.
Co-operative staff member, Los Altos
Some non-organised producers also said that it did not pay
to be organic. According to them the organic production
methods did not give sufficient yields, and although the
price was higher, so also was the work load. In contrast,
many organic producers claimed that organic production
was indeed the most profitable choice.
The payment system of co-operatives and intermediaries
could also explain the producers’ choice. Intermediaries
receive loans from exporters and can therefore pay pro-
ducers the moment they hand over their coffee. Co-oper-
atives traditionally have difficulties obtaining financial
resources to pay for transactions (Turtiainen and Von
Pischke 1986). Fairtrade and organic certification gives
advantages in terms of both facilitating access to local
credit, and prepayment from importers. But not all the
importers offer the co-operatives the pre-payment they
should according to the Fairtrade standards, a problem not
only in Chiapas (Raynolds 2009). Since they lack working
capital the co-operatives usually give members a residual 2
or 3 months after the harvest, when all the importers have
paid for their deliveries. For some of the interviewed co-
operatives lack of finance meant they could not buy all the
coffee offered by their members, who were forced to sell to
the intermediaries instead. On the other hand many co-
operatives, as well as intermediaries, often give producers
loans or prepayments to pay workers for the harvest.
According to the previously mentioned survey in Chiapas,
half of the co-operatives give members a prepayment for
their deliveries, and in general there is variation among the
co-operatives in how attractive their credit systems are.
As can be seen in Table 3, the members receive on
average \74 % of the entire payment at the moment of
delivery, and 18 % as a residual. On average the co-oper-
atives offer 22 % of the total payment as a prepayment. A
majority of those who answered offer members the possi-
bility to take up loans. But many producers choose to sell
to the intermediary because they need a loan that is larger,
that can be given earlier, or they may need the entire
payment at the moment when they deliver their coffee.
This can deter producers from entering a co-operative, but
it is also a reason why many members sell a part of their
coffee harvest to the coyote. This way they have an income
while waiting for the rest of their payment from the co-
operative. In times of high conventional coffee prices,
members’ side-selling to intermediaries can prevent co-
operatives from meeting contractual obligations with
importers, and possibly lad to de-certification (Murray
et al. 2006).
Some producers might also be sceptical about joining a
co-operative because they do not trust it. With the inter-
mediary, they receive their payment promptly as they
deliver their coffee. With the co-operative, they have to
wait for part of their payment. Unfortunately there have
historically been many cases of fraud and corruption
among co-operative leaders in Chiapas, which causes sus-
picion. Several interviewed stakeholders referred to stories
of co-operative leaders pocketing members’ money, and
the probability of unethical behaviour in Latin American
organisations is unfortunately not insignificant (Arruda
Table 2 Membership fees, in USD
Mean Median Min Max Answers
Entry fee new members 32.6 10 0 150 23
Yearly fees members 12.2 5 0 70 20
Source: Survey of 38 organic co-operatives in Chiapas, Mexico, May
2007
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1997; Rice 2001). And even when members do not worry
about corruption, they could still fear that their appointed
leaders will lose their money because of mistakes or mis-
management. For instance, there have been several occa-
sions in which inexperienced co-operatives have been
cheated by purchasers who never paid them for their
coffee.
Survey analysis of coffee producers in Jitotol, Chiapas
Jitotol is a municipality situated in the north of Chiapas.
Coffee production is one of the main economic activities in
this area, but most producers have very small coffee plots
and rely on remittances from migrated relatives and
transfers through government programmes. The level of
marginalisation is high, with 27 % being illiterate and half
of the population living on dirt floors (INEGI 2007). 73 %
of the population speak an indigenous language, zoque
(Ibid). In 2007 there was one main coffee co-operative in
the area, the Fairtrade and organically certified co-opera-
tive UREAFA.5 Approximately 40 % of the coffee farmers
in the region were members of this co-operative.
In 2007 a household survey was carried out in the area in
relation to a research project financed by the Inter-Ameri-
can Institute for global change research (IAI)6 and organ-
ised by researchers from four different Central American
countries (for more information see Castellanos et al.
2012). The survey contains 1,281 interviews with a ran-
domly selected sample of coffee producers from five dif-
ferent areas in Chiapas, Honduras, Costa Rica and
Guatemala. The data was collected during the summer and
autumn of 2007. The aim of the study was to investigate
coffee farmers’ adaptation to climatic change and market
instability, and a number of questions were asked in rela-
tion to this. Of the two regions in Chiapas that were sur-
veyed, Jitotol was the only area where the majority of the
producers had the option of joining a Fairtrade and
organically certified co-operative, hence only the results
from this area could be used for this analysis. There were
altogether 154 observations from this area.
Reasons for not joining a co-operative, household
survey results
After responding to the question ‘‘Are you or anyone in
your family a member of a co-operative, association or
group?’’, those who answered ‘‘no’’ were asked ‘‘Why do
you not belong to any organisation?’’. There was a list of
alternatives, among which the respondents could choose
three. In addition they could give other reasons not on the
list. Altogether 90 non organised coffee producers
answered. The results are shown in the Table 4.
There are 18 % who say they do not want to join
because it is a lot of work, indicating that the organic
requirements are a disadvantage. This can also be reflected
by the 3 % who say it is because it takes a lot of time. In
addition, among the other reasons mentioned for not join-
ing, 4 producers say that it is because they are using
chemical inputs, and 2 say that the co-operative ‘‘wants
Table 3 Details on
prepayment, loans and residuals
in co-operatives
Source: Survey of 38 organic
co-operatives in Chiapas,
Mexico, May 2007
Mean Median Min Max Answers
Prepayment, in percentage of total price paid 22 % 0 % 0 % 90 % 29
Months before harvest prepayment given 3 2 0.5 8 16
Maximum loan members can take, in USD 501 200 15 2,000 12
Monthly interest rate 1.7 % 1.5 % 0 % 5 % 11
Payment received at moment of delivery, in
percentage
74 % 83 % 0 % 100 % 20
Payment received as residual, in percentage 18 % 16 % 0 % 50 % 18
Months after harvest residual received 2.5 2 1 8.5 18
Table 4 Reasons for not joining a co-operative, Jitotol, Mexico
Reason Number of
responses
Percentage of total
respondents (%)
Don’t like it 17 19
A lot of work 16 18
Because of politics 16 18
Do not know any 10 11
The co-operative pays very late 5 6
Corruption 4 4
A lot of time 3 3
No economic benefit 3 3
Other reasonsa 21 23
Total 95 106
Source: Survey financed by the Inter-American Institute for global
change research (IAI) 2007
a Among the answers given, 6 were related to coffee production
methods, 2 to politics and 6 answered that they had not joined because
they ‘‘had not been invited’’
5 Unio´n Regional de Ejidatarios Agropecuarios, Forestales y de
Agroindustria de los pueblos Zoque y Tzotzil del estado de Chiapas.
6 www.iai.int.
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very clean coffee’’. But although reasons related to the
production requirements of the co-operative are important,
they do not have an overwhelming majority. In Jitotol
politics is an important reason for not joining a co-opera-
tive (18 %). An explanation of this is found in the char-
acteristics of the only co-operative in the area, UREAFA,
which is strongly associated with the political party PRD.
Until the co-operative became Fairtrade certified, only
producers supporting PRD were allowed membership.
Since FLO do not allow discrimination, they had to change
this rule, but the links with PRD still remain strong and
producers supporting the other political parties may not
feel welcome. This is an example of how a strong ideology
may be an excluding factor in a co-operative. Fear of
corruption is not an often quoted reason for not joining
(4 %), neither is late payment (6 %). The most quoted
reason for not joining is ‘don’t like it’ (19 %). This is a
rather vague answer, the respondents could in reality have
reasons for not joining both linked to organic requirements,
ideology or other factors.
Survey on production costs
The survey and the qualitative study from Chiapas revealed
that there are several reasons for joining or not joining
Fairtrade and/or organic co-operatives, but the organic
production requirements stand out as an important factor.
The non members claimed that these requirements made
membership unprofitable, but were contradicted by the
members. An explanation could be that those who choose
membership have certain prerequisites which make organic
production more beneficial to them.
Several studies have found that organic coffee produc-
tion implies more work than conventional (Gobbi 2000;
Pe´rez Grovas 2000; Lyngbæk et al. 2001; Bray et al. 2002;
Martinez-Torres 2006; Jaffee 2007; Gliessman 2008;
Beuchelt and Zeller 2011). Some studies have also found
that coffee production with chemical inputs generates
higher yields than production with organic methods (Lyn-
gbæk et al. 2001; Martinez-Torres 2006; Kilian et al.
2006). Other studies have also found that organic produc-
tion generates higher yields than natural production, which
is production with neither chemical inputs nor specific
organic methods (Martinez-Torres 2006; Pe´rez Grovas
2000; Bolwig et al. 2009; Barham et al. 2011).
In order to find out more about the costs and benefits of
organic production in Chiapas, a survey was organised by
the author among organic and non-organic coffee produc-
ers from the municipality of Jitotol. The aim was to find out
if there is a difference in the number of work hours and
yields of organic and non organic producers, taking into
account the different agricultural tasks performed by the
different producers, including whether or not chemical
inputs were used.
The interviewees were chosen in order to get a balanced
sample of producers representing different categories.7 A
distinction was made between co-operative members
(organic producers), non members using chemical inputs
(chemical producers) and non members not using chemical
inputs (natural producers), and also between producers
with different coffee plot sizes.8
Costs of conversion to organic production
In order to become a co-operative member, the producers
have to become organically certified, which implies com-
pliance to a set of requirements. The requirements for
organic coffee production are listed as 39 different points
in the standards document from the Mexican organic cer-
tifier organisation Certimex (Certimex 2007). Most of the
requirements have a direct relation with protection of the
environment, but some have merely the purpose of secur-
ing the quality of the coffee, so that, according to a Cer-
timex employee, there may be sales of organic coffee, and
not just production.
Compliance with the organic requirements might imply
undertaking certain activities. Converting coffee producers
may have to change to coffee plants that are adapted to the
local climate in order to be resistant to plagues and ende-
mic diseases. Plants should also be renovated when they
become too old, and pruned regularly. This is a Certimex
requirement for maintaining continuity in production, and
it is more related to quality production than to environ-
mental protection. Organic coffee should also be grown
under diversified shade trees, but since 90 % of the coffee
grown in Mexico is already grown under diversified shade
(Giovannucci and Jua´rez Cruz 2006), this requirement
rarely generates extra activity for converting producers.
In order to avoid soil erosion, producers need to build
terraces, and live and dead barriers. Live barriers are
bushes planted closely together to stop the soil from run-
ning downhill, dead barriers are made of stones or soil.
Also, to improve the contents of the soil in terms of
nutrients and micro organisms, organic producers should
apply compost. The compost should be made of recycled
material such as the fruit flesh from the coffee berries,
leaves and weeds, as well as ashes and manure from cows.
Problems with plagues and diseases should also be solved
with organic methods. To some extent pruning, shade
7 It turned out to be difficult to find producers with more than two
hectares, and only one producer was found with more than five
hectares. The average coffee plot size for the sample is 1.24.
8 A pilot for the survey was done in the late spring of 2007. The
survey itself was done during the summer and autumn of 2007.
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regulation and weed control will prevent these problems,
otherwise methods such as insect traps, natural prepara-
tions and manual control should be applied. To avoid
plagues and diseases it is important that all the berries are
removed from the trees during harvest.
There are also requirements concerning processing. The
majority of coffee producers in Chiapas use the wet pro-
cessing method, which means that the coffee beans are
fermented in water before they are dried. Organic coffee
should be fermented in boxes or tanks and not in streams or
springs, which would cause pollution. The water used for
the fermentation should afterwards be deposited in a pit so
that it will be filtered before going into the rivers. The
beans should be dried with solar energy on patios or roof
tops, and not with mechanical tumble dryers.
A producer joining an organic co-operative has to wait
for 3 years before receiving the full organic coffee price.
This is a general rule that applies regardless of whether the
producer has previously used chemical input or not. In the
survey, the organic producers in Jitotol were asked how
much time and money they had spent during the 3 years of
conversion. An overview is given in Table 5. Most of the
producers did the soil conserving activities, and the
majority spent time on the construction of fermentation
tanks and drying patio, while\30 % took training courses
and made filtration pits. Those interviewed were also asked
about purchases of new coffee plants, but nobody said they
had done this.
The table shows that on average producers converting to
organic spend both a substantial amount of money and time
in the conversion phase. However, there is a lot of variation
among the producers, and the high average is to some
extent driven by outliers. Many organic producers have not
performed all the tasks. The reason could be that they had
already done what was necessary for certification, but they
could also be shirking, although shirkers risk expulsion. As
for the financial costs, many producers said they had
received financial support through the co-operative for the
construction of the necessary equipment, therefore their
costs were 0.
There is little correlation between land size and the time
and money spent on the conversion to organic production.
This indicates that performing these activities has fixed
costs, which means that they are less worthwhile for the
smallest producers than for the larger ones.
Comparison of yearly costs and yields for organic, natural
and chemical production
A comparison of average work hours spent on coffee
related activities by organic, natural and chemical pro-
ducers can be seen in Table 6 below.
The organic producers spend on average more than
twice as many hours in total as the natural producers in
their coffee fields, but only 24 % more hours than the
chemical producers. Organic producers spend significantly
more time on activities related to the organic requirements:
composting and fertilising, renovating plants and soil
conservation (terraces and barriers). The fact that the
organic producers spend more time on harvesting is on the
one hand related to the quality requirement which makes it
necessary to pick only the ripe berries and therefore use
several rounds. But it may also be part of a natural plague
control strategy. Taking off all the berries to the last,
including the low quality ones, prevents different coffee
plagues from spreading. When comparing the use of
labour, the organic producers have a significantly higher
average than the natural producers, but only during the
harvest period. The chemical producers on average use
more labour than both the organic and the natural
producers.
Concerning yields, Table 6 shows that the mean coffee
production per hectare for the last 3 years is higher for the
organic producers than for the natural, but lower than for
the chemical producers. However, the differences are not
statistically significant. This means that also the chemical
producers are not significantly more productive than the
other groups, which is interesting, since they spend a
substantial amount (170 USD per hectare on average) on
fertilizers.
Table 5 Costs of conversion to organic production
Variable Obs Mean Median Min Max Did activity (%)
USD used on fermentation tank 28 39 0 0 400 50
USD used for construction material 28 191 0 0 1,500 36
Hours spent making filtration pit 29 17 0 0 150 28
Hours spent making fermentation tank 29 48 27 0 200 66
Hours spent making drying patio 29 230 54 0 3,000 69
Hours spent on training courses 29 6 0 0 135 21
Hours spent on soil conservation 29 261 153 0 2,432 86
Total hours spent all 3 years 29 800 384 0 4,648 100
Source: Data collected in Jitotol 2007
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The average yield per hour worked is highest for the
natural producers, while the organic and chemical pro-
ducers have similar levels. But neither of these averages
are significantly different from the others. The price
received by the organic producers is higher than for the
other groups, and this difference is statistically significant.
The net income per hectare of the organic producers is
significantly higher than that of the natural producers, and
when expenses on chemical fertilisers are deducted it is
also significantly higher than the income of the chemical
producers. Net income per hour is highest for the natural
producers, and lowest for the chemical producers. It is
important to remember that these results are based on
prices from 2007. With lower international coffee prices, a
larger difference between organic/Fairtrade and conven-
tional prices would be expected. Since 2007 international
prices for Arabica coffee have gone up, and although they
have later decreased again they are still higher than in
2007. Hence it is not likely that there is a larger economic
benefit from co-operative membership today.
The reason why organic production does not give higher
returns to hours worked could be found when looking at the
types of activities performed by the different groups.
Organic producers spend significantly more time on fer-
tilizing with compost, renovation and soil conversation,
which are activities that are mainly meant to increase either
the quality of the coffee, or the long term sustainability of
the land. Renovation, for instance, means cutting down old
trees that do not produce quality coffee anymore. This may
decrease yields in the short term since the new plants will
not bare fruits before 3–4 years. Also, the non-organic
producers perform the more directly productive activities
such as pruning and weeding almost to the same extent as
the organic. This can explain why there is not more dif-
ference between the 3 groups concerning yields. However,
it may be the case that in the longer term renovation and
soil conservation activities will pay off, and provide higher
yields for the organic producers.
Who cooperates?
During field research, coffee stakeholders in Chiapas were
asked about the difference in the characteristics of co-
operative members and non-members. Many saw the
members as more hard-working, and with a positive
attitude to organic coffee cultivation. Small coffee plot
sizes were seen as an advantage for organic cultivation,
since most of the work was done by family members. But
only to a certain point. Those with \0.5 ha of land were
said to be more likely to leave the co-operative, and one
Table 6 Differences between natural, organic and chemical producers: average per hectare work hours, use of labour and coffee yields
Natural Organic Chemical
Number of observations 24 29 27
Average plot size 1.7 1.3 1.1
Hours spent on making compost and fertilizing 19 246ab 46
Hours spent on weeding 164 207 152
Hours spent on pruning and plant bending (agobio) 159 213 128
Hours spent on renovation 19 91ab 23
Hours spent on terraces 24 90a 56
Hours spent on harvest 997 2048a 1,486
Mean total work hours per year 1,241 2,732 2,202
Number of family members working normal period 2.5 3.5 3.9
Number of employed working normal period 0.3 0.6 0.6
Number of family members working during harvest 3.1 4.7a 5.1
Number of employed working during harvest 1.9 3.5a 4.5
Coffee yields, mean last 3 years (in kg) 367 415 383
Coffee produced per hour worked 2007 (in kg) 0.3 0.21 0.22
Coffee price received per kg 2007 (USD) 1.48 1.75ab 1.44
Income from coffee sales 2007 (USD) 507 674a 610
Net income from coffee sales 2007 (USD) 507 674ab 440
Net income per hour worked (USD) 0.42 0.35b 0.22
Source: Data collected in Jitotol 2007
a Statistically significantly (at 10 % level) different from natural producers
b Statistically significantly (at 10 % level) different from chemical producers
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co-operative would not even let producers that small enter
as members. The reason given was that the production
was too small, and the coffee was not well cared for.
The study on production costs shows that the activities
where organic producers make an extra effort, such as
composting, making barriers and renovating plants, have
more fixed costs than other activities. This means that these
activities are less worthwhile for the smallest of the pro-
ducers. In addition members spend on average 20 h per
year on co-operative meetings. Due to these fixed costs the
smallest producers may not find it worthwhile to become
co-operative members. On the other hand the larger pro-
ducers may find that labour costs increase too much due to
the production requirements.
Stakeholders interviewed during field research claimed
that having more children was an advantage for co-
operative members, since they could help with the har-
vest. Hiring people implies expenses in terms of mone-
tary outlays: in 2007 a labourer was paid on 6.1 USD per
day during harvest and 5.3 USD the rest of the year.
Often the producers need to take up high interest loans to
finance the salaries of the coffee pickers during harvest.
This means that the availability of labour within the
family could increase the profitability of being a member
of a co-operative, and that producers with more working
household members are more likely to join. In relation to
this, the alternative costs of labour for the producers and
their family members must be considered. According to a
study from Chiapas by Barham et al. (2011) the returns
from labour opportunities outside coffee are better than
those in Fairtrade and organic coffee. But in Jitotol there
are few job opportunities except during the harvest when
there is a demand for coffee pickers. The remaining
option is to migrate for work, either to nearby urban
centres which are about half a day’s journey away, to
larger cities in Mexico or as far away as the US.
Migration, especially to the US, has become highly risky
over the last years with the violence of the drug wars.
We can nevertheless assume that different households
have different valuations of the migration options. If they
consider migration and earning money elsewhere as an
attractive alternative to working in the coffee field, then
the likelihood of joining a co-operative decreases. But if
the option is leisure, then co-operative membership is
economically more favourable. A different question to
consider is whether demand for coffee labour prevents
young family members from attaining a higher education
level, which in the long term could be a more beneficial
time investment, as pointed out by Barham et al. (2011).
However, as it seems to be mostly during the harvest
period that there is extra demand for labour, the survey
does not provide clear evidence that this is a problem in
Jitotol.
The previously mentioned IAI financed household sur-
vey is based on a random sample of co-operative members
and non-members from Jitotol in 2007. This data can be
used to look for statistical differences between members
and non-members. A number of variables from the data set
are selected and analysed both by mean comparisons of
members and non-members, and probit analysis.
We want to see which factors influence the likelihood of
being a co-operative member. Coffee area, number of
household members and number of working household
members are, as we have seen, likely to influence because
of the fixed costs of organic cultivation, and the extra work
required. We also include in the analysis characteristics of
the household head: Age, gender, whether he or she ever
attended school, and years of experience as a coffee pro-
ducer. These variables are relevant as control variables, and
also they might say something about the producers’ skills,
which are necessary to produce organic coffee and which
therefore may influence the probability of being a member.
Other relevant variables are whether or not coffee is the
principal source of income for the household, which might
increase the likelihood of being a co-operative member,
and the road distance to the municipality head, where both
the co-operative and the intermediary purchasers have their
warehouses. The last one is relevant for several reasons,
one is that the villages further away are at a higher altitude,
and it is therefore easier for them to produce the quality
coffee required by the co-operative. Another is that mem-
bers who live closer to the co-operative may know it better
and therefore trust it more. Whether or not the producer
owns a radio is relevant because it reflects the wealth level,
or possibly how well informed the producer is, both of
which may influence the decision to join or not.
Table 7 presents the summary statistics of the sample
households and compare the means for the members and
the non-members.
The table shows that co-operative members on average
have half a hectare more coffee area than non-members, or
more than 50 % more. Looking more closely at the data, it
can seem like it is particularly the producers with coffee
plot sizes measuring 0.5 ha or less that do not join the co-
operative: 9 % of the co-operative members have 0.5
hectare or less, versus 32 % of the non-members. Between
0.5 and 1 hectare the two groups have a more similar
representation: 44 % of non-members and 40 % of the
members have areas of this size. These are also very small
scale farmers hence numbers from this survey does not
prove that organic cultivation excludes small scale pro-
ducers. But it seems to be the case that the smallest of the
small producers do not find co-operative membership
worthwhile.
The co-operative members have more household mem-
bers, and more people in the household doing work that
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brings income to the family. Co-operative members are on
average slightly older than non-members, and have more
experience as coffee producers. The co-operative members
are more likely to own a radio, and on average they live
further away from the municipality head. There is no sig-
nificant difference in school attendance, whether the
household head is male or female or whether or not coffee
is the principal source of income.
In order to establish which characteristics of producers
correlate with the probability of being member of a co-
operative, a probit analysis with marginal effects (Woold-
ridge 2002) is performed. The analysis was carried out in
Stata, which provides an estimation of the effect of an
infinitesimal change in the continuous variables on the
probability of being a member of the co-operative. For
dummy variables it reports the discrete change in the
probability. The results are presented in Table 8.
We observe that a larger coffee plot size increases the
likelihood of being a member of the co-operative, but the
result is significant only at the 10 % level. Attempts at
including quadratics of coffee plot size together with the
linear ones failed to give robust results, hence there seems
to be no support in these data sets that producers with plot
sizes above a certain size are less likely to be co-operative
members. This is possibly because all the coffee plot sizes
in the sample are small.
There is also a positive correlation between co-operative
membership and the number of people working in the
household, significance is here at the 5 % level, which is
stronger than for the coffee plot size. Hence the results
support the hypothesis that producers with more available
work force in the family are more likely to be members of
organic co-operatives. Gender, education, age, and the
number of years as coffee producers have no significant
impact on the probability of being a member of the co-
operative. Neither has having coffee as the principal source
of income. Owning a radio increases the likelihood of
being a member. However, we do not know if this is
because co-operative members earn more than non-mem-
bers and therefore can afford to buy a radio, or because
producers owning a radio are more likely to join the co-
operative, either because they are more wealthy and can
Table 7 Mean comparison coffee producers in Jitotol by co-operative membership status
Variables Mean
Members (n = 64) Non-members(n = 90) Mean-comparison test
Area of coffee plot (hectare) 1.54 (1.11) 1 (0.67) 3.77***
Number of household members 6.28 (0.31) 5.78 (0.2) 2.14*
Number of people in household working 2.33 (1.33) 1.78 (0.81) 3.18**
Household head gender (1:male) 0.89 (0.04) 0.9 (0.03) -0.19
Household head age 45 (1.8) 39 (1.56) 2.34*
School attendance (1:has attended) 0.55 (0.06) 0.64 (0.05) -1.22
Experience as coffee producer (in years) 20.81 (11.8) 16.13 (9.32) 2.74*
Coffee is principal source of income 0.80 (0.41) 0.86 (0.35) -0.95
Owns a radio 0.64 (0.06) 0.48 (0.05) 2.01*
Road distance to municipality head 19.5 (3.09) 14.47 (3.45) 9.3***
Source: Survey financed by the Inter-American Institute for global change research (IAI) 2007
Standard deviations are given in brackets. Mean-comparison test gives t-values
*** Significant at 1 % level
** Significant at 5 % level
* Significant at 10 % level
Table 8 Results probit analysis from Jitotol (marginal effects) (1:
member; 0: non member)
Variables Estimates
Area of coffee plot (hectare) 0.15* (0.08)
Number of household members -0.01 (0.02)
Number of people in household working 0.11** (0.04)
Household head gender (1: male) -0.12 (0.17)
Household head age -0.005 (0.005)
School attendance (1: has attended) -0.08 (0.1)
Experience as coffee producer (in years) 0.005 (0.005
Coffee is principal source of income -0.13 (0.14)
Owns a radio 0.18* (0.1)
Road distance to Municipality head 0.09*** (0.01)
N 153
Pseudo-R2 0.38
Source: Survey financed by the Inter-American Institute for global
change research (IAI) 2007
*** Significant at 1 % level
** Significant at 5 % level
* Significant at 10 % level
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afford the entry costs, or because their radio makes them
better informed about for instance coffee prices and the
situation for coffee producers.
‘‘Road distance to municipality head’’ is positive and
highly significant, meaning that producers living further
away are more likely to be a member of a co-operative.
This is possibly related to the fact that the co-operative
requires a high level of coffee quality, which is easier to
obtain at higher altitudes. The municipality head of Jitotol
is at a low level, and the further away the producers live,
the higher they are above the sea level. It could also be the
case that producers who live closer to the municipality
head find it easier to bring their coffee there and choose
among the different intermediaries who operate from there.
Producers living further away are to a larger extent obliged
to buy from the intermediaries arriving with their pick-up
trucks, and may therefore have a preference for the co-
operative. Another explanation is a clustering effect, that
the producers living in the village furthest away have been
influenced by their neighbours to join the co-operative.
Conclusion
The intention of the Fairtrade model is to ‘‘offer farmers
and agricultural workers in the global South better prices,
stable market links and resources for social and environ-
mental projects’’ (Raynolds 2009). Previous studies have
found that both the Fairtrade and the organic labelling
systems provide small scale coffee producers with benefits
such as better prices, different collective goods and
empowerment through the strengthening of grass roots
organisations (Raynolds et al. 2004; Bacon 2005; Ruben
2008). However, there are many producers who, although
given the opportunity, decide not to become members of
Fairtrade and organic co-operatives. This study is the first
one to search for an explanation to this seemingly para-
doxical situation by considering systematically both the
material and immaterial costs and benefits of Fairtrade and
organic co-operative membership.
The results of the study confirm that Fairtrade and
organic labelling provide benefits to highly marginalised
producers living near extreme poverty. But co-operative
membership also has certain costs, among which the
organic production requirements are the most important.
This study finds that organic production does require more
hours of work than natural production or production with
chemical fertilisers, and that the net income per hour
worked is lower for the organic producers than for the
natural producers, which confirms the results of previous
studies (Pe´rez Grovas 2000; Bray et al. 2002; Jaffee 2007;
Beuchelt and Zeller 2011). The explanation for the com-
paratively low profitability of organic production is that the
agricultural activities where organic producers spend sig-
nificantly more time are not the ones that increase yields in
the short term. The fact that the natural and chemical
producers perform many of the directly yield increasing
activities almost to the same extent as the organic also
reduces the difference in yields between the three types of
producers. However, the costs and benefits of the organic
option will differ among different producers, and those
producers with more free family labour and who live at
higher altitudes have lower costs and higher benefits. Also,
although co-operative membership is found to be beneficial
for very small scale producers, producers with coffee areas
of \0.5 ha are less likely to join because of fixed costs.
The study indicates that for the producers in Chiapas,
the premium for certified coffee is not a ‘‘free lunch’’
offered to a few lucky ones. The higher price provided by
the Fairtrade and the organic market may be more accu-
rately viewed as compensation for many extra hours of
work spent in the coffee fields, and it seems to be the case
that the higher price offers are necessary for the co-oper-
atives to be an attractive alternative to the ‘‘coyote’’.
Considering the aims of the Fairtrade system to broaden
and deepen its impact on marginalised producers (Murray
et al. 2006), it may seem counter intuitive to have
restrictions on membership which make it less attractive
for some producers. But, firstly, this study confirms that
producers who join the co-operatives are indeed small scale
and highly marginalised, and they are undoubtedly in the
target group of the FLO. Secondly, the organic require-
ments have an important function, as they assure the pro-
duction of quality coffee with the organic label, for which
there is demand, and which generates a higher price (Kilian
et al. 2006; Barham et al. 2011). If the co-operatives did
not impose the organic requirements, they would not have
been able to provide the same quality coffee, which would
make marketing more difficult. One of the main challenges
for Fairtrade coffee has been to improve its quality (Murray
et al. 2006). We also need to take into account that the
supply of Fairtrade coffee is much larger than the demand
(Murray et al. 2006; Ruben 2012), while this is not the case
for organic coffee (Ruben 2012). This means that co-
operatives that are only Fairtrade certified get a lower price
because they do not get the organic premium, and they sell
a larger share of what their members deliver as conven-
tional, non-labelled coffee. If these co-operatives were to
stay at a size corresponding with their sales of labelled
coffee, they would have to find restriction methods other
than organic production requirements. One such restriction
method would be to close the co-operative entirely to new
members. But, it would not then be able to have a bene-
ficial effect on the competitive situation and the prices
offered by intermediaries (Sexton 1990; Milford 2012).
The co-operatives could also restrict membership by
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imposing a higher entry fee, but this would to a larger
extent exclude the producers with the least financial
resources. The organic requirements thus seem to fulfil
several functions: they provide ecological and health ben-
efits, market access for quality coffee production with a
corresponding higher price, and in addition the coopera-
tives avoid the problem of overproduction of Fairtrade
certified coffee.
But although the organic production requirements may
work as an entry barrier to joining co-operatives, this study
finds that there are also other aspects of the co-operatives
which influence the producers’ decision on whether to join
or not. In the case of the particular co-operative studied
here, political ideology, seen as an important factor for co-
operative success (Raynolds et al. 2004), was also a factor
deterring many from entering. Another important reason
for not joining is the lack of trust, which is related to co-
operatives having a reputation for fraud and mismanage-
ment. Preference for the payment system of the interme-
diary may also explain the producers’ choices. The
‘‘coyote’’, although he has a reputation for cheating on
price, weight and quality, can also offer what some pro-
ducers need: an immediate payment, and in some cases a
loan to cover expenses for the harvest.
It is important to keep in mind that as a small scale
coffee producer in Chiapas it is difficult to obtain a very
large income, even with Fairtrade and organic premiums.
But as long as there is a lack of other safe job opportunities,
joining a certified co-operative is for many a better option
than not. And as long as there is demand for organic coffee
among consumers, Mexican co-operatives and their sup-
porters should continue to try to encourage small scale
producers to become organically certified. This study has
shown that the organic requirements are barriers to entry,
but that there also are other aspects that deter producers
from joining the co-operatives, and which may be worked
upon. Co-operative membership could thus be encouraged
by building up trust in co-operative organisations, and not
allowing for discrimination of certain producers. This
points to the importance of supervising co-operative lead-
ers, as is being done by FLO. Improving their credit
schemes and payment systems may also increase the
attractiveness of the co-operative option. This may also
provide the co-operatives with more organisational and
economic strength, while staying true to the organic
principles.
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